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INTRODUCTION

About fifteen years ago, I was honored to have been contacted by
Professor Margaret Blair to discuss a phenomenon about which she was
intrigued. That phenomenon was the proliferation of nongovernmental
standards for corporate social and environmental responsibility and the
related development of “third-party assurance” services to certify
companies’ compliance to those standards. Whether factories, farms,
forests, mines, fishing boats, or handcraft workers, voluntary standards
of responsible conduct existed, and a burgeoning industry of third-party
assurance providers was developing. Professor Blair had become an
advisory-board member of the Worldwide Responsible Apparel
Production (“WRAP”) initiative, which is now the “largest independent
facility certification program in the world focused on apparel, footwear,
and sewn products.” 1 Through that experience, she was observing this
developing complex of nongovernmental standard setting, inspection,
assurance, and certification in action, and she wanted to examine it
from an academic perspective. My work to that point had concentrated
on the nongovernmental standard-setting aspect as evidence of
corporate social responsibility (“CSR”), and “new governance” in action.
So, Professor Blair’s focus on inspection, assurance, and certification of
those standards was new to me, and I enthusiastically accepted her
invitation to start reading and discussing together what it might mean
and why it might be interesting.
Early in our investigations we were joined by an extremely
talented JSD student at the University of Illinois, Li-Wen Lin, who is
now a professor at the Peter A. Allard School of Law of the University
of British Columbia. Li-Wen brought highly developed intellectual
capacity to the project, as well as language skills, being originally from
Taiwan and thus able to read Chinese. She had also recently finished a
superb paper on legal transplants, so our initial conception of the role
of nongovernmental standard setting and assurance focused on it as a
mechanism to import developed-country norms of responsible behavior
into developing countries, such as China. Yet as our understanding of
1.
About, WORLDWIDE RESPONSIBLE ACCREDITED PROD., https://wrapcompliance.org/about/
(last visited Sept. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/R8AX-KX5G] (formerly “Worldwide Responsible
Apparel Production”).
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the importance of this complex of standard setting and assurance
mechanisms ultimately developed, we began to recognize that the social
and environmental standard setting was a specific instance of a larger
phenomenon in global commerce, which was the standardization of
processes and product specifications generally, through the auspices of
the International Standards Organization (“ISO”). Thus, it was
standardization that came to be a key component of our analysis, since
it was standardization that ultimately connected to a deeper theoretical
issue, which was Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm and the “make or
buy” question at the heart of his theory. 2
Standardization, we argued, of both product specifications,
through ISO, and of social and environmental process specifications,
through both ISO and nongovernmental CSR standard setting, and
then certification to those standards, “reduce a number of the costs of
contracting that Coase identified with market transactions—
undertaking negotiations, writing contracts, and settling disputes—
and so allow moving transactions out of firms.” 3 These processes allow
“private ordering regimes to extend globally and beyond close-knit
commercial communities” and “permit the development of trust
necessary to sustain private ordering” where face-to-face transactions
were not possible or would increase costs prohibitively. 4 Thus, we
argued, these external mechanisms of assurance of the quality and
product specifications to ISO standards, and as expanded to assurance
that productive processes met developing social and environmental
norms, both reduced the transaction costs of market transactions and
replicated some of the benefits of managerial control over operations
otherwise found within the firm.
Working together with Professor Blair (and with Li-Wen) was a
real joy. Professor Blair’s standards for the quality of intellectual work
are impeccable. She is both extremely careful and creative, which are
qualities not always found within one person. Moreover, her ability to
2.
See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 404 (1937) (“The question
always is, will it pay to bring an extra exchange transaction under the organising authority [of the
firm].”).
3.
Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The Roles of Standardization,
Certification, and Assurance Services in Global Commerce, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND RELATED
DISCIPLINES 299, 317–18 (Lorenzo Sacconi, Margaret Blair, R. Edward Freeman & Alessandro
Vercelli eds., 2011) [hereinafter Blair, Roles]. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A.
Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L.
325, 326 n.1 (2008) (discussing how standard setting and assurance could reduce the costs of
contracting).
4.
Blair, Roles, supra note 3, at 319.
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connect facts with theory pushed our thinking forward in a way I
thought—and think—was quite productive. Working together, we
analyzed these external mechanisms that promote both the internal
goals of the firm (e.g., high standards of quality for its products, cost
containment, some degree of legal certainty) and, increasingly, could
facilitate the firm’s external goals of meeting social and environmental
norms for production, while also reducing the burdens of operational
control and reducing the risks of legal responsibility when things go
wrong in the social or environmental realm by facilitating production in
supply chains.
We argued that these private law initiatives, with
nongovernmental standards, inspections, assurance, and certification,
advanced public-law goals of social and environmental protection. But
I see now that there is another, equally meritorious interpretation of
this trend. What we had evaluated as a mechanism for companies to
take responsibility for their social and environmental actions—the
development of non-governmental standards and then third-party
assurance—is also a mechanism that permitted companies to disclaim
social responsibilities by facilitating the development of supply chains
that often (although not always) are a barrier to accountability
for harm.
As with any intellectual project, there were strands of thinking
we were unable to develop at the time, and it is one of those strands I
develop here. Corporate-law scholarship for decades has been occupied
with agency costs and how to mitigate them. 5 But when I teach the basic
business organizations class, starting with agency law and looking at
the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and full disclosure of any agent to
her principal, we explore both costs and benefits of agency relationships.
I do so by introducing Ronald Coase’s theory of the firm. Using an
example close to most second-year law students’ experience, that of
buying a suit for interviews, I contrast Brooks Brothers establishing its
own factories (the “make” decision) with Brooks Brothers using supply
chains, contractors, and subcontractors (the “buy” decision) to produce
its clothing. After discussing Coase’s ideas on transaction-cost
economics and managerial hierarchy, I then ask the students how law
fits into the picture. How could the fiduciary duties of agents within a
firm reduce transaction costs in the “make” decision versus the “buy”
decision? The students can readily identify that these fiduciary duties
within a firm would require the firm’s agents not to shirk
responsibilities, not to compete with the principal, not to steal
5.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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intellectual property, not to sell trade secrets, and to come forward with
economically significant information, such as drops in the price of
materials or competing businesses starting up, without being asked.
Thus, within the firm, the fiduciary duties of agents can reduce
transaction costs, since none of these important protections would need
to be negotiated, as they would in market transactions, either on spot
markets or within established supply-chain relationships. But, as the
students also recognize, operating within the firm potentially increases
the risks of liability due to the concept of respondeat superior, and so we
are back to the advantages of supply chains, standardization, and the
institutional arrangements that replicate managerial control.
But I remain intrigued with the benefits as well as the costs of
agency relationships and in particular the possible power of fiduciary
duties to be harnessed to advance the firm’s social responsibilities. That
is, can internal mechanisms of the firm, the private law (from a
European perspective) fiduciary duties of agents, be used to advance
external public law goals? Instead of outward standards of
responsibility being brought into the firm through external mechanisms
(i.e., voluntary standards development and third-party assurance),
could the internal standards of agents’ responsibilities to the firm, their
fiduciary duties, be used to extend responsible action beyond the firm
and through that mechanism actuate what many are calling for as the
firm’s social responsibilities?
In this paper, I take up this question by reference to a public law
issue much in focus today, that of climate change. In Part I, I provide
an extremely brief overview of the understanding of climate risk as a
financial risk, connecting that overview to the question of why private
law fiduciary duties might be engaged to address that risk. In Part II, I
summarize the familiar territory of directors’ and officers’ fiduciary
obligations, using Delaware law as the exemplar, and in Part III, I
describe a more ambitious approach to directors’ fiduciary obligations,
a new idea by the Dutch academic and practitioner Jaap Winter of
directors having “societal duties.” In Part IV, concentrating on
Delaware law, I develop some of the implications of these duties for
directors’ and officers’ obligations to include climate change in their
oversight, strategic direction of the company, and possible disclosure.
Part V connects these discussions back to the question with which I
began, that is, could the fiduciary duties of officers and directors be
engaged to securely ground the company’s duties to society generally,
beyond climate change? I then briefly conclude the article.
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Agency law is one of the oldest areas of law. Yet, as others have
also recognized, 6 today, in light of significant rhetorical shifts in
understanding of companies’ purposes and officers’ and directors’
fiduciary, and possibly moral, obligations to address systemic issues
like climate change, increasing economic inequality, and systemic
racism, agency law can have new power. Agency costs have played a
central role in many of the intellectual inquiries and traditions central
to corporate law and finance. By this Article, I submit that agency law’s
benefits should start to have a coequal role.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AS A FINANCIAL RISK
Climate change awareness is motivating governments around
the world to agree to accelerate a transition to a low-carbon economy,
seen most specifically in the global agreement by close to two hundred
countries in Paris in December 2015, to limit the warming of the earth
to “well under” 2º Celsius compared to the pre-industrial era and to
“pursuing efforts” to limit warming to 1.5° Celsius. 7 In 2018, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) issued a special
report on the implications of warming 1.5ºC versus 2.0ºC. It concluded
that there are “robust differences” between warming of 1.5ºC versus
2.0ºC in temperature extremes, droughts, heavy precipitation events,
floods, sea level rise, impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems, increases
in ocean temperatures and acidity, including effects on marine
diversity, fisheries, and marine ecosystems, negative effects on human
health, on agricultural productivity, water stress, and economic

6.
See Chris Brummer & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Duty and Diversity, 75 VAND. L. REV
(forthcoming 2022) (evaluating fiduciary duty law in Delaware as a source of an obligation for
companies to incorporate equality, diversity, and inclusion more robustly into company practices);
Lisa Benjamin, The Road to Paris Runs Through Delaware: Climate Litigation and Directors’
Duties, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 313, 353–63 (2020) (discussing trends in climate litigation and how
those trends may affect courts’ interpretations of directors’ duties to incorporate climate change);
Edward J. Waitzer & Douglas Sarro, Fiduciary Society Unleashed: The Road Ahead for the
Financial Sector, 69 BUS. LAW. 1081, 1115 (2014) (arguing that the financial sector is being
pressured to better define and protect society and the public interest through an expanded concept
of fiduciary duty).
7.
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change art. 2, para. 1(a),
Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (“Holding the increase in the global average temperature to
well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and
impacts of climate change[.]”). See generally Paris Agreement: Status of Ratification, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process/the-parisagreement/status-of-ratification (last visited Aug. 13, 2021) [https://perma.cc/CH6W-KH2J] (the
Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016 when countries representing fifty-five
percent of global GHG emissions had ratified the Agreement; 160 countries had ratified the
Agreement by August 2017).
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growth. 8 The report identified both emissions and adaptation pathways
that could limit warming to 1.5ºC and, significant for this analysis,
stated that “[p]artnerships involving non-state public and private
actors, institutional investors, the banking system, civil society and
scientific institutions would facilitate actions and responses consistent
with limiting global warming to 1.5ºC.” 9 As the report also stated,
government policy could support and facilitate the necessary
investments in both emissions reductions and adaptation, which, if
undertaken at scale, would also support achieving the United Nations’
Sustainable Development Goals and global poverty reduction. 10
The purely financial risks of continuing to rely on coal and fossil
fuels as the basis for modern economies are increasingly well
demonstrated. One particularly useful report was published in 2019 by
Mercer, a consultant to institutional investors with over $10 trillion
under management, analyzing the risks and opportunities from climate
change and the transition to a low-carbon economy. 11 It evaluated the
effects on various portfolios, such as a growth portfolio and a
sustainable growth portfolio, 12 under three different scenarios: one
showing a 2ºC increase by 2100 in global average temperatures as
compared to pre-industrial temperatures, which would require
“aggressive” climate action; one a 3ºC increase by 2100, which assumes
“some climate action but not transformative”; and the third a 4ºC
increase by 2100, which is Mercer’s estimate of the increases to be
expected under today’s business-as-usual pathway. 13 Mercer relied on
data from Cambridge Econometrics that integrates “the treatment of
economics, energy systems and the environment to capture linkages
and feedbacks,” in order to evaluate the effects of the different scenarios
on its model portfolios. 14
8.
MYLES ALLEN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for
Policymakers, in SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, 1, 8 (Valerie Masson-Delmotte et
al.
eds.,
2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2MM5-M3YU] (“An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the
context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.”).
9.
Id. at 23.
10. Id. at 19–21.
11. MERCER, INVESTING IN A TIME OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE SEQUEL 11 (2019),
https://info.mercer.com/rs/521-DEV-513/images/Climate-change-the-sequel-2019-full-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6A6L-3NCB].
12. Id. at 75 fig.33.
13. Id. at 81–83.
14. Id. at 7.

2021]

FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND CORPORATE
CLIMATE RESPONSIBILITY

1883

to meet their fiduciary duties. 17 Mercer’s analysis suggests that any
investor holding a business-as-usual, diversified equity portfolio that is
not sustainability themed, and with significant oil, gas, and coal
holdings, risks “undue loss,” indeed catastrophic loss in some asset
classes, starting to eventuate over the next eleven years. Given Mercer’s
analysis of the financial risks of investments in coal, oil and gas, or
utilities relying on those energy sources, and other similar findings, 18
the materiality predicate for investment fiduciaries’ obligations to
evaluate these data as part of their fiduciary duties is established. But
do similar conclusions follow for officers and directors? This Author’s
analysis suggests the answer to that question is yes.
This Article is not the place to detail the financial risks to
operating companies and financial institutions of climate change; this
Author and many others have done that elsewhere. 19 Yet it is perhaps
sufficient to point out that generally, our collective understanding of
climate change has evolved from construing it as a purely ethical or
environmental externality to recognizing it as an issue that poses
foreseeable financial risks and opportunities for U.S. companies and
systemic risks to the financial system across short-, medium-, and longterm horizons. 20 Climate change remains an “enormous market failure”
17. Id. at 6.
18. See, e.g., MARK LEWIS, BNP PARIBAS ASSET MGMT., WELLS, WIRES, AND WHEELS…:
EROCI AND THE TOUGH ROAD AHEAD FOR OIL 3 (2019), https://docfinder.bnpparibasam.com/api/files/1094E5B9-2FAA-47A3-805D-EF65EAD09A7F [https://perma.cc/RY6Y-DBFY].
BNP Paribas calculates that the EROCI (“Energy Recovered on Capital Investment”) of oil versus
renewables for powering transportation over the next twenty-five years and finds that—compared
with oil powering internal combustion engines—the combination of new solar or wind with electric
vehicles will produce six to seven times the energy for powering light-duty vehicles. Id. Further, it
finds that oil must be sold at about ten dollars per barrel in order for it to be cost competitive with
solar and wind energy over the next twenty-five years. Id.
19. See, e.g., SARAH BARKER & ELLIE MULHOLLAND, COMMONWEALTH CLIMATE & L.
INITIATIVE, DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY AND CLIMATE RISK: COMPARATIVE PAPER – AUSTRALIA, CANADA,
SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 7 (2019), https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/CCLI-Directors%E2%80%99-Liability-and-Climate-Risk-ComparativeBARKER,
Paper-October-2019-vFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4F2S-YRQR];
SARAH
COMMONWEALTH CLIMATE & L. INITIATIVE, THE CLIMATE RISK REPORTING JOURNEY: A CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PRIMER 1 (2018), https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/CCLIClimate-Risk-Reporting-Journey-vFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVZ3-TAT9]. These papers and
other climate risk research are available at Publications, COMMONWEALTH CLIMATE & L.
INITIATIVE
(last
visited
Sept.
28,
2021),
https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/publications/
[https://perma.cc/XZ9Y-TJJD]. See also Benjamin, supra note 6, at 319; Sarah Barker, An
Introduction to Directors’ Duties in Relation to Stranded Asset Risks, in STRANDED ASSETS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: RISKS, RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITIES 199, 235 (Ben Caldecott ed., 2018).
20. This assessment is shared by, for example, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. See CLIMATE-RELATED MKT. RISK SUBCOMM., U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, MANAGING CLIMATE RISK IN THE US FINANCIAL SYSTEM, at ii (2020),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/9-920%20Report%20of%20the%20Subcommittee%20on%20Climate-
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due to the lack of appropriate, governmentally enforced incentives to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 21 But even in the absence of a robust
economy-wide carbon price, climate risks and impacts are being
internalized on the balance sheets of U.S. corporations, directly and
indirectly, through a changing climate and efforts to address climate
change across three key pathways:
• Physical risks to both natural and built environments, from both
acute catastrophic and gradual onset impacts;
• Economic transition risks arising from the transition towards a
net-zero emissions economy and associated shifts in the
regulatory, technological, and stakeholder landscape within
which businesses operate; and
• Litigation exposure stemming from the attribution of climate
change to a company’s activities or the failure to manage the
impacts of climate change on the business. 22
First categorized as immediately above by then-Governor of the
Bank of England Mark Carney in an influential speech to Lloyds of
London entitled Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon, 23 these risks are
Related%20Market%20Risk%20%20Managing%20Climate%20Risk%20in%20the%20U.S.%20Financial%20System%20for%20pos
ting.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E2W-LP77] [hereinafter CFTC REPORT]; see also NETWORK FOR
GREENING THE FIN. SYS., THE MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPACTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE
6
(2020),
https://www.ngfs.net/sites/default/files/medias/documents/ngfs_research_priorities_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RWM8-UUE3]; PATRICK BOLTON, MORGAN DESPRES, LUIZ AWAZU PERIERA DA
SILVA, FRÉDÉRIC SAMAMA & ROMAIN SVARTZMAN, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENT, THE GREEN SWAN:
CENTRAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 65 (2020),
https://www.bis.org/publ/othp31.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9DT-MCDB]; TASK FORCE ON CLIMATERELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATERELATED
FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURES
8
fig.1
(2017),
https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2020/10/FINAL-2017-TCFD-Report-11052018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52GZ-99TB] [hereinafter TCFD REPORT].
21. CLIMATE-RELATED MKT. RISK SUBCOMM., supra note 20, at xix.
22. See PRUDENTIAL REGUL. AUTH., BANK OF ENG., THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE
UK INSURANCE SECTOR 64 (2015), https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudentialregulation/publication/impact-of-climate-change-on-the-uk-insurance-sector.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6T67-FABJ].
23. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Eng., Speech at Lloyd’s of London: Breaking the Tragedy
of the Horizon – Climate Change and Financial Stability 3 (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.bis.org/review/r151009a.pdf [https://perma.cc/KE2T-CT4A] (calling climate change a
“tragedy of the horizon” because it requires policy responses and potential sacrifices today for
benefits that will accrue after today’s corporate leaders and politicians leave office). Soon after
delivering this speech, then-Governor Carney persuaded the Financial Stability Board to put
together a global consortium of investors, accountants, and company executives, known as the
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), to develop a global, voluntary
framework for evaluating and disclosing companies’ financial risks from climate change. About,
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/about/ (last visited
Aug. 14, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UNS2-UZHL]. Established in December 2015 and chaired by
Michael Bloomberg with special assistance from former SEC Chair Mary Schapiro, the TCFD
seeks disclosure of companies’ governance, strategy, risk management, targets, and metrics for
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far reaching in breadth and magnitude across the economy, involve
uncertain and extended time horizons, but are also foreseeable risks
today for most industries. Climate risks are particularly acute for
entities in sectors such as energy and natural resources, utilities,
transport, real estate, infrastructure, agriculture, and financial
services. 24 Exposure to climate risks extends to companies across
almost every sector of the U.S. economy, however, with the Sustainable
Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”) identifying material climaterelated financial impacts to U.S. companies operating in sixty-eight out
of seventy-seven industries, potentially affecting eighty-nine percent of
U.S. public equity market valuation. 25 The World Economic Forum’s
(“WEF”) 2021 Global Risks Report identifies climate change related
physical trends, governance failures, and environmental implications
as among the five out of the top six risks to the global economy. 26
Recent actions by the Biden Administration have put climate
change financial risks into the spotlight, as President Biden has moved
quickly to emphasize climate change as part of both U.S. foreign and
domestic policy. On his first day in office, January 20, 2021, President
Biden declared support for the Paris Climate Agreement and its
threefold goals of “a safe global temperature, increased climate
resilience, and financial flows aligned with a pathway toward low
greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.” 27 His
climate change executive order on January 27, 2021, established a
process to embed climate risk mitigation in every executive agency of
the federal government, including establishing an interagency

evaluating climate change risks and opportunities. See Letter from Commonwealth Climate & L.
Initiative
to
the
U.S.
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n
(June
13,
2021),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8914495-244736.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QJ8R-3CBZ]. See generally TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES
(last visited Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/ [https://perma.cc/3TFT-4C6N].
24. TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FIN. DISCLOSURES, supra note 20, at 16.
25. SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., CLIMATE RISK TECH. BULL. 5 (2021),
https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Climate-Risk-Technical-Bulletin2021042821.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GLM-DSWZ]. The SASB has worked with investors and members of
industry throughout the United States to develop targeted, industry-specific ESG disclosure
standards. See generally SASB STANDARDS, https://www.sasb.org/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/FN5K-FVQ9].
26. WORLD ECON. F., GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 14 fig.4 (16th ed. 2021),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_Global_Risks_Report_2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5UE-BVBG].
27. Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021); Presidential Statement on
Acceptance of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change on Behalf of the United States, 2021 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 49 (Jan. 20, 2021).
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coordinating process and appointing both a foreign and domestic policy
lead in newly established positions within the White House. 28
Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen has demonstrated that
climate change will be a priority by creating a hub within Treasury that
will focus on financial system related risk posed by climate change and
tax policy incentives to effect change. 29 In a speech on April 21, 2021,
she vowed to build on President Biden’s “whole-of-government”
approach with a “whole-of-economy” approach. 30 One month later,
President Biden issued an Executive Order on Climate Change
Financial Risk, with responsibilities for Treasury, the Office of
Management and Budget (“OMB”), and the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (“FSOC”) and its constituent agencies. 31 Among its
significant aspects are initiatives to:
(1) require the development of a government-wide strategy to
assess, measure, and disclose climate change financial risk
across the federal government;
(2) request a financial analysis of the capital needed to move the
U.S. economy to net-zero by 2050;
(3) require Treasury to work with FSOC and its constituent
agencies to identify actions by regulated firms within each
agency’s remit to identify, measure, mitigate, and disclose
climate change financial risks;
(4) identify financial risk from climate change within the insurance
industry;
(5) identify actions that can be taken by the Department of Labor to
protect pension savings and federal pension insurance from
climate change financial risk; and
(6) identify how the federal government can incorporate climate
change financial risk into its lending, risk underwriting,
procurement, and budgeting. 32
This executive order followed a new report by the International
Energy Agency (“IEA”) setting out a global roadmap of how to transition
28. Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619.
29. Yellen Says Would Appoint Senior Climate Official at Treasury, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2021,
12:26
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-yellen-climate-idUSKBN29O2B3
[https://perma.cc/U72V-BKZQ].
30. Janet L. Yellen, Sec’y of the Treasury, Remarks to the Institute of International Finance
(Apr. 21, 2021), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0139 [https://perma.cc/2DJ5MLMC].
31. Exec. Order No. 14,030, 86 Fed. Reg. 27971 (Feb. 1, 2021).
32. Id. The Securities and Exchange Commission is an independent agency, so not part of
the President’s executive order, but it, too, is taking a whole of agency approach to climate change,
and is widely expected to promulgate new disclosure obligations on climate change. See text
accompanying notes 148–149, infra.
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to a net-zero energy system by 2050, including four hundred specific
milestones for what needs to be done to meet that ambitious goal. 33
Significantly, the report recognizes that there can be no new oil and gas
fields approved for development as of 2021, nor can there be any new
coal mines or mine extensions. 34
Each of these regulatory actions portend significant
implications for companies in oil, gas, coal, finance generally, pensions,
and insurance, as well as companies selling goods to the U.S.
government, and for directors’ and officers’ fiduciary obligations in each
of these industries. Adding the SASB conclusions that climate change
is a material risk in sixty-eight of seventy-seven industries into the
analysis, it is easy to conclude that companies across the U.S. economy
have reason to incorporate climate change into their decisionmaking
structures. Crucially, the magnitude of future financial risks depends
in part on decisions taken today, which is why this analysis looks to the
fiduciary obligations of officers and directors of U.S. companies
for leverage.
II. FIDUCIARY LAW IN DELAWARE
As agents of the corporation and its shareholders, officers and
directors in the United States have obligations to act consistently with
duties of care, loyalty, and full disclosure. Generally speaking, the duty
of care requires officers and directors to make lawful, reasonably
informed decisions. 35 The duty of loyalty requires officers and directors
to act in good faith, put the interests of the corporation above their own
interests, and, in Delaware, exercise oversight regarding law
compliance. 36 The duty of full disclosure encompasses an affirmative
duty for agents to bring forward economically significant information to
the principal and to communicate honestly in all “public or direct”
communications with the corporation’s shareholders. 37 These duties
33. STÉPHANIE BOUCKAERT ET AL., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY., NET ZERO BY 2050: A ROADMAP
GLOBAL ENERGY SECTOR 3 (Oct. 2021), https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050
[https://perma.cc/VJU2-MW3J].
34. Id. at 21.
35. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985).
36. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62 (Del. 2006) (discussing
good faith determinations); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372–73 (Del. 2006) (examining oversight
duties regarding law compliance).
37. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998):
Whenever directors communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about the
corporation’s affairs, with or without a request for shareholder action, directors have a
fiduciary duty to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith and loyalty. It follows a
FOR THE
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will be described in somewhat more detail before analyzing theories of
directors’ and officers’ fiduciary obligations to consider climate change
carefully, honestly, and in good faith in their deliberations
and decisionmaking.
A. The Duty of Care
Officers and directors are required by the duty of care to make
decisions carefully in light of “all material information reasonably
available to them.” 38 One of the few cases in Delaware to have found
directors potentially liable for breach of the duty of care, Smith v. Van
Gorkom, was an extreme example of failing in this regard. The case
concerned the board’s decision to sell the company, Trans Union,
without the board having previously agreed that it should explore a sale
of the company, without a proper valuation study, and where the
directors asked no questions when presented with the CFO’s report in
a hastily called board meeting that the price per share for selling the
company was “ ‘in the range of fair price,’ but ‘at the beginning of the
range.’ ” 39 In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that gross
negligence in the procedure by which a decision is made is the standard
of culpability in order to impose personal liability on members of the
board for a breach of the duty of care. 40 On the record before it, the court
concluded that the “Board of Directors did not reach an informed
business judgment” where they
(1) Did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom’s [CEO] role in forcing the
“sale” of the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price; (2) were
uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these circumstances,
at a minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the “sale” of the Company upon two
hours’ consideration, without prior notice [of the agenda of the meeting], and without the
exigency of a crisis or emergency. 41

Arguably, according to that standard, in the climate change
context a board may breach its duty of care where it totally fails to
inform itself about the foreseeable and financially material climate
risks relevant to its industry; or if it does consider emerging information
and trends on climate change, is grossly negligent in the process of

fortiori that when directors communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about
corporate matters the since qua non of directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders is honesty.
38. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
39. Id. at 869.
40. Id. at 873.
41. Id. at 874.
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evaluating that information. 42 That said, boards of directors in the
United States have powerful defenses against personal liability for
breach of the duty of care. These defenses include the business
judgment rule and the ability of companies in the United States to
exculpate directors, but not officers, in their certificate of incorporation
against liability for breach of the duty of care. 43
1. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is an evidentiary presumption that
“in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.” 44 Absent evidence of
gross negligence in the procedure of making the decision, an unlawful
decision, or bad faith, courts will not second-guess business decisions
made by the board even where a decision has lost the company a
material amount of money. 45 Given these limits to the business
judgment rule, however, it will not protect directors where the
evidentiary presumption is overcome by allegations, and ultimately
proof, that (a) the process the board used to inform itself prior to making
a decision was grossly negligent; 46 (b) the decision was unlawful; 47 (c)
the decision was not made in good faith; 48 or (d) where unconsidered
inaction is the basis of the loss, that is, where there is no business
decision to protect. 49 This latter concept of “unconsidered inaction” has
42. See, e.g., id. at 893 (holding that a business decision reached by a board of directors that
was grossly negligent in the process of being informed of relevant considerations applicable to its
decision to sell the company is not protected by the business judgment rule).
43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2021).
44. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
45. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc.,
683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
46. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872. A similar result would likely be had in Canada. See,
e.g., UPM-Kymmene Corpor. v. UPM-Kymmene Miramichi Inc., 2002 CanLII 49507, para. 156
(Can. Ont. S.C.) (“However, directors are only protected [by the business judgment rule] to the
extent that their actions actually evidence their business judgment. The principle of deference
presupposes that directors are scrupulous in their deliberations and demonstrate diligence in
arriving at decisions.”).
47. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
(AM. L. INST. 1994) (providing no business judgment rule protection for knowing violations of law);
Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding the same).
48. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 62 (Del. 2006) (reviewing the
standard for good faith determinations).
49. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
Directors’ actions would not be protected by the business judgment rule if plaintiffs’ allegations
were proven at trial: “[P]laintiffs’ new complaint suggests that the Disney directors failed to
exercise any business judgement and failed to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary
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become important since 1996, at least in theory, as part of the board’s
Caremark duties to ensure that the corporation is taking law
compliance seriously. 50 It will be discussed further below.
Moreover, the business judgment rule will not initially protect
directors where a conflict-of-interest transaction or other breach of the
duty of loyalty is alleged, although it can be reinstated in a duty of
loyalty context by the board showing it took certain procedural steps to
ensure that the transaction has not been affected by the underlying
conflict of interest; or the directors’ actions can be upheld by alleging,
and ultimately proving, that the transaction is “entire[ly] fair.” 51
2. Exculpation
Soon after Smith v. Van Gorkom was decided in 1985, the
Delaware legislature passed section 102(b)(7) to the Delaware General
Corporation Law. This provision allows companies to eliminate or limit
liability for members of the board for breaches of the duty of care by
putting an “exculpation clause” 52 in the certificate of incorporation.
Such a provision does not apply to protect officers, however, and nor can
it exculpate members of the board for breach of the duty of loyalty, for
acts or omissions not in good faith, for unlawful distributions, or for
intentional violations of law. 53
These limits to the protection of the business judgment rule and
exculpation clauses under Delaware law inform the conclusion of this
analysis: notwithstanding these protections, officers and directors may
face potential fiduciary liability if they utterly fail to consider climate
change as part of their decisionmaking and/or oversight. The most
important of these limits to directors’ protection are the requirements
duties to Disney and its stockholders.” Id. At trial, plaintiffs’ allegations were not proven to the
satisfaction of the Chancery Court, and that holding was upheld on appeal in an important opinion
by the Delaware Supreme Court clarifying the meaning of “good faith.” In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 905 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
50. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2021); see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710
(Del. 1983) (discussing “entire fairness”).
52. See § 102(b)(7). Section 102(b)(7) provides that the certificate of incorporation may
include:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation
or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director,
provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i)
For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii)
for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title [unlawful distributions rendering
the company insolvent]; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit.
53. Id.
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for boards to exercise their power in “good faith” and taking account of
their “duty of oversight,” both now construed as subsidiary elements of
the duty of loyalty. Conscious disregard of a known duty to act will not
be protected because of these aspects of the duty of loyalty. These
concepts will be discussed below, after setting out the general outlines
of the duties of loyalty and full disclosure.
B. The Duty of Loyalty
1. General Duty of Loyalty Concepts
Generally, the duty of loyalty requires directors to act in good
faith, lawfully, and in the best interest of the company. It is most
typically at issue in conflict-of-interest situations, such as when a
parent company engages in transactions with a subsidiary, or when one
or more of the officers or directors are on both sides of a transaction. In
any conflict-of-interest situation, the board may follow specific
procedures to either reinstate business judgment rule protections or to
show that a conflicted decision is entirely fair to the corporation. 54 In
Delaware, so long as it is not a controlling shareholder transaction, the
protections of the business judgment rule can be reinstated, by either
independent directors approving the transaction or independent
shareholders approving the transaction, given full disclosure of
relevant facts about the conflict and the transaction. 55 In a controlling
shareholder transaction, if a well-informed, independently advised
special committee negotiates the terms of the transaction on behalf of
the minority shareholders and that transaction is approved by both a
majority of independent directors and a majority of the minority (nonconflicted) shareholders, business-judgment-rule review is reinstated. 56
A conflict-of-interest transaction can also be upheld as against duty of
loyalty challenges if the board demonstrates that the transaction is
“entirely fair” to the corporation and its shareholders, which is defined

54. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7, 710.
55. See In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194 (Del. Ch. 1995).
56. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. (MFW), 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). In MFW, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that a merger between a controlling stockholder and its subsidiary,
where conditioned on the “approval of both an independent, adequately-empowered Special
Committee that fulfills its duty of care, and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the
minority stockholders” would be subject to the business judgment standard of review. Id. at 641.
Under that standard of review, the defendants will prevail unless plaintiffs can prove that the
transaction was nonetheless waste (no rational businessperson would agree to the transaction on
its terms) or a gift.
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as fair dealing and fair price. 57 Decisions that are not in good faith or
that are unlawful are breaches of the duty of loyalty, and cannot be
“freshened” by the above procedures. 58
2. Caremark Claims
The Delaware Supreme Court has further held that “[w]here
directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby
demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they
breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary
obligation in good faith.” 59 Originally construed as part of the duty of
care in Caremark, 60 these “duty of oversight” (also called the “duty to
monitor”) claims are now held to be part of the duty of loyalty. 61 As such,
these claims cannot be exculpated, and officers and directors cannot be
indemnified for any personal liability. 62 Nor would claims raising
oversight concerns properly be met with the protection of the business
judgment rule unless the court finds that what is actually being
challenged is the board’s decision about how to conduct its business or
its decision about appropriate levels of oversight.
Until recently, the duty of oversight has been rather narrowly
applied. The Delaware courts draw a distinction between the board
failing to ensure that the corporation institutes adequate compliance
systems in order to prevent violations of positive law by a company’s
employees, which can give rise (in theory) to liability, versus its failing
to act to prevent excessive business risk. Claims of the latter Caremark
type, failures of the board to properly oversee business risk, have not
yet survived motions to dismiss, 63 notwithstanding language in
57. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. Fair dealing examines how the transaction was “timed,
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of
the directors and the stockholders were obtained.” Id. at 711. In any transaction between a
controlling shareholder and its controlled entity, the Delaware courts will expect to see a special
committee of the board of the controlled entity constituted with full authority to negotiate, and
with independent legal and financial advisors. See id. at 709 n.7. Fair price “relates to the economic
and financial considerations of the proposed” transaction. Id. at 711.
58. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (discussing good
faith).
59. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted).
60. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
61. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
62. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2021) (limits to exculpation); id. § 145(a)-(b)
(company’s power to indemnify its agents limited to actions in good faith, which is part of the duty
of loyalty).
63. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A.5215, 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12,
2011). Both of these cases arose out of the financial crisis of 2007–2008. In both cases, plaintiffs
asserted that the board had failed in its duty to monitor business risks, given a “pay for
performance” compensation system, Goldman, 2011 WL 4826104, at *15, or given activities in the
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Caremark that could support such claims. 64 Yet, there are a number of
subsidiary bodies of positive law that may create litigation or liability
risk for boards that fail to consider climate change risk, as will be
discussed below, particularly securities law, international human
rights obligations, and general anti-fraud provisions of tort law. Failing
to act in the face of duties to act in those contexts may arguably give
rise to duty of loyalty liability for failing to provide oversight of the
company’s activities. Moreover, a 2019 Delaware Supreme Court
opinion, Marchand v. Barnhill, has allowed a duty of oversight claim to
go forward in a context where business risks, not just law compliance,
were being ignored, giving some further insight into, and potentially
extending, this line of fiduciary precedent. 65 These aspects of the duty
of oversight will be further discussed below. 66
C. Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure
For public-reporting companies in the United States, federal
securities laws and regulations provide guidance for information that
needs to be disclosed, and for the standards of accuracy expected
regarding that information. But affirmative disclosure obligations are
also part of any agent’s fiduciary duties, requiring disclosure to the
principal of economically significant information without being asked. 67
subprime market generally, id. at *22; Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 114–15. The defendants successfully
moved to dismiss the duty to monitor claims in both cases, with the Chancery Court drawing the
distinction discussed in the text. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 135 n.96; Goldman, 2011 WL 4826104, at
*22–24.
64. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970:
[I]t would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude . . . that corporate boards may satisfy
their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation, without assuring
themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization that are
reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely,
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its
scope, to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with
law and its business performance.
That the language of Caremark can support such “business risk” claims has been recognized
by Prof. Stephen Bainbridge, who is quite critical of the decision and more recent expansions. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Don’t Compound the Caremark Mistake by Extending it to ESG Oversight
(UCLA Sch. of L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 21-10, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3899528
[https://perma.cc/963P-VTN9].
65. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019).
66. See infra Section IV.B.
67. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998) (discussing fiduciary duty of disclosure).
The classic case regarding the importance of fiduciary disclosure in the United States is Meinhard
v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 (1928), in an opinion by then-Chief Justice of the New York Court of
Appeals, later Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Benjamin Cardozo. Speaking of fiduciary
relationships, Chief Justice Cardozo wrote that one with fiduciary obligations “is held to something
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The leading case in Delaware is Malone v. Brincat, where the
Delaware Supreme Court held that general fiduciary principles require
honest disclosure:
The shareholder constituents of a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon their
elected directors to discharge their fiduciary duties at all times. Whenever directors
communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about the corporation’s affairs, with
or without a request for shareholder action, directors have a fiduciary duty to
shareholders to exercise due care, good faith and loyalty. It follows a fortiori that when
directors communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about corporate matters the
sine qua non of directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders is honesty. 68

While federal securities law generally preempts state securities
law or causes of action based on state fiduciary duties of disclosure, this
preemption does not apply in “the State in which the issuer is
incorporated,” 69 referred to colloquially as “the Delaware carve-outs.” 70
Moreover, Malone v. Brincat could become important in fiduciary
litigation in privately held companies, which are becoming a more
substantial part of the U.S. corporate market. 71
III. FIDUCIARY LAW AS PUBLIC LAW I: THE DUTCH PROPOSAL OF A
SOCIETAL DUTY
For operating companies, the fiduciary duty concept as set out
above is primarily a procedural duty of the board and management to
consider climate change risks and opportunities in strategy and
oversight, with rather limited—but I will suggest growing—potential
for fiduciary liability. Further progress on addressing climate change
may require an interpretation of fiduciary obligations as either (1) a
substantive duty to align the company’s business strategy with
transforming the economy to avoid a 1.5ºC expected outcome (“Paris
compliant”), or at the least (2) a duty to explain how the company’s risk
management and operational strategies are consistent with best

stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” Id. at 464.
68. 722 A.2d at 10.
69. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d).
70. Malone, 722 A.2d at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. Professor Elisabeth de Fontenay has written about the decline of the public company in
the United States, providing the following data: from 2001 to 2012, ninety-nine initial public
offerings per year on average occurred in the United States, compared to 310 on average per year
from 1980 to 2000. Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of
the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 454–55 (2017). Through 2017, the number of public
firms fell from 8,025 in 1996 to 4,101 in 2017. Id. at 457. In these firms, affirmative disclosure
obligations of management to the firm’s shareholders would be based primarily on agency-law
duties of the agent to disclose economically significant information to the principal, as in Meinhard
v. Salmon or Malone v. Brincat.
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scientific estimates of global conditions if we are living in a world that
is, on average, 1.5ºC hotter than preindustrial levels.
This conception of a substantive fiduciary duty to be Paris
compliant is consistent with, and supported by, an ambitious proposal
by a leading Dutch lawyer, company advisor, and academic, Jaap
Winter. Winter proposes that company directors need to be understood
to have a “duty of societal responsibility,” which includes a duty to
“act[ ] responsibly with a view to the interests of society” and a duty to
“use[ ] investor, human, social and natural capital” responsibly. 72
Winter developed his theory in part as a response to what he perceives
to be the limitations of stakeholder theories of existing Dutch
corporate law.
Winter’s concept was recently supported by twenty-five Dutch
corporate law professors and lawyers in the leading Dutch daily
financial newspaper, Het Financieele Dagblad, and is engendering an
energetic discussion in the Netherlands. 73 Winter’s concept can be used
as an argument, in conjunction with others, such as Rockström’s
planetary boundaries 74 and Raworth’s “doughnut economics,” built on
Rockström et al., 75 to transform the understanding of directors’ and
managers’ fiduciary duties from a procedural duty into substantive
Paris compliance. Indeed, grounding substantive fiduciary duty
obligations on Winter, Rockström et al., and Raworth suggests that
“Paris compliant” as the standard for boards’ fiduciary obligations is not
an unrealistic ambition and is in fact not the maximum ambition those
contributions would support. “Paris compliance” is at least
intellectually justifiable, given the global community’s agreement to
that goal, even as it would need substantial argument and case law
development in support. Again, the implications of this idea will be
discussed below.
72. Jaap Winter, Addressing the Crisis of the Modern Corporation: The Duty of Societal
Responsibility
of
the
Board
11
(Apr.
13,
2020)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3574681 [https://perma.cc/76Z5-BG28].
73. Gerard van Solinge, Jaap Winter, Matthijs de Jongh, Steven Hijink & Vino Timmerman,
Opinion, Maatschappelijk verantwoord besturen en toezichthouden, dat is het nieuwe normaal
[Socially Responsible Management and Supervision, That is the New Normal], HET FINANCIEELE
DAGBLAD (May 23, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://fd.nl/opinie/1345474/maatschappelijk-verantwoordbesturen-en-toezichthouden-dat-is-het-nieuwe-normaal [https://perma.cc/DW2T-8Q93].
74. Johan Rockström et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472 (2009).
75. Kate Raworth, A Safe and Just Space for Humanity: Can We Live Within the Doughnut?,
OXFAM INT’L (Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/safe-and-just-space-humanity
[https://perma.cc/7NLK-JQHY]. Raworth is a heterodox economist who now teaches at both the
University of Oxford and the University of Cambridge. She has transformed the Oxfam paper into
a book based on global discussions, including of the Sustainable Development Goals. See KATE
RAWORTH, DOUGHNUT ECONOMICS (2017).
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF OFFICERS’ AND DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Duty of Care
As information about the risks of climate change improves and
the attribution of the specific effects of individual companies’
greenhouse gas emissions to climate change becomes clearer, officers
and directors of all companies must carefully evaluate such information
when making decisions. No cases have held this to date, but neither are
we aware of any cases having yet been brought using this theory of
liability. This conclusion follows from fundamental principles
established in fiduciary duty of care cases, particularly as the physical,
regulatory, and financial risks of climate change become clear. 76 When
acting in the best interests of the company and its shareholders, officers
and directors must consider the emerging science of climate change,
must be aware of the changing physical environment and effects of
climate change on business resources and infrastructure, and must
carefully evaluate regulatory changes and countries’ commitments in
the Paris Agreement of 2015 when developing business strategies,
forward-looking plans and commitments, and scenario analyses. This
assertion is based on the general definition of the duty of care, which,
according to Chancellor Allen in Caremark, asks as a “core element”
concerning board decisions whether there was “a good faith effort [on
the part of the board] to be informed and to exercise appropriate
judgment.” 77 This duty is evident as well in Canada, underscored in
addition by its stakeholder orientation. 78
One response to this argument in the United States is that the
defenses to liability for breach of the duty of care are so strong that
there is no realistic potential for personal liability for directors failing
to exercise their duty of care as articulated here. At least three
rejoinders to that response are possible.
76. The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), a voluntary initiative
convening industry participants, investors, and accountants to develop standards for the
disclosure of decision-relevant environmental, social, and governance information in the United
States, has concluded that climate change is a material financial risk in sixty-eight of seventyseven industries it examined. SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 25, at 5.
77. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (emphasis
omitted). Caremark was a duty of care case, although as stated above “Caremark obligations” are
now understood as subsidiary elements of the duty of loyalty.
78. See JANIS SARA, COMMONWEALTH CLIMATE & L. INITIATIVE, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN
BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
6–9
(2018),
https://ccli.ouce.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Janis-Sarra_Fiduciary-Obligation-inBusiness-and-Investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/54HB-YG37] (discussing the duty of care in
Canada).

2021]

FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND CORPORATE
CLIMATE RESPONSIBILITY

1897

First, corporate law in the United States draws a clear
distinction between the required standards of conduct for directors to
meet their standard of care and the standards of liability. 79 This
distinction, instantiated through the business judgment rule, exists to
protect directors’ ability to make decisions based on a well-informed
understanding of risks and benefits, which encourages thoughtful,
entrepreneurial activity. It does not follow that any director’s
responsibility is simply: do not be “grossly negligent.” As stated in the
2016 revisions of the Model Business Corporations Act (“MBCA”) of the
American Bar Association’s Committee on Corporate Law, boards are
required to be informed and to act with the requisite “care that a person
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar
circumstances” in their decisionmaking, 80 even if liability is not possible
because of exculpation clauses or the business judgment rule. 81
The commentary to the recently revised MBCA is useful in
considering the duties of directors to be informed before making
decisions. That commentary states:
The phrase “becoming informed,” in the context of the decision[ ]making function, refers
to the process of gaining sufficient familiarity with the background facts and
circumstances to make an informed judgment. Unless the circumstances would permit a

79. This distinction can most clearly be seen in the Model Business Corporation Act, which
is an authoritative project of the American Bar Association’s Committee on Corporate Law.
Compare MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (providing standards of conduct for
directors), with id. § 8.31 (providing standards of liability for directors). Section 8.30 states, in
part:
(a) Each member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director,
shall act: (i) in good faith, and (ii) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation.
(b) The members of the board of directors or a board committee, when becoming
informed in connection with their decision-making function or devoting attention to
their oversight function, shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a
like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.
Delaware does not have a statute setting out the requirements of the duty of care. Rather, the
law on the fiduciary duty of care in Delaware is developed by case law. Still, the implicit distinction
between the standard of conduct expected of directors, and standards of liability, is evident in a
number of Delaware decisions. In the Disney Delaware Supreme Court opinion, the court upheld
the Chancery Court’s determination that in evaluating Michael Ovitz’s compensation package,
which was the core aspect being challenged in the litigation, the compensation “committee’s
process did not fall below the level required for a proper exercise of due care, [though] it did fall
short of what best practices would have counseled.” In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906
A.2d 27, 56 (Del. 2006). Caremark similarly evaluated all the reasons that directors should ensure
a functioning information and reporting system, but then defined a liability standard much higher
than best practice for determining oversight liability. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968–70.
80. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b).
81. See D. Gordon Smith, The New Business Judgement Rule, in THE RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 83 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016)
(examining the limitations of director liability given the business judgment rule).
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reasonable director to conclude that he or she is already sufficiently informed, the
standard of care requires every director to take steps to become informed about the
background facts and circumstances before taking action on the matter at hand. . . . In
addition to considering information and data on which a director is expressly entitled to
rely under section 8.30(e) [officers and employees of the firm, lawyers, accountants, and
other experts retained by the firm, other board committees], “becoming informed” can also
involve consideration of information and data generated by other persons, for example,
review of industry studies or research articles prepared by third parties. . . . There is no
one way for “becoming informed,” and both the method and measure—“how to” and “how
much”—are matters of reasonable judgment for the director to exercise. 82

Second, the business judgment rule does not protect
unconsidered inaction. 83 That is, there must be a decision made before
the business judgment rule is relevant. So, for instance, if a property
and casualty or health insurance company had done no analysis or
modeling of how climate change was changing its risk profiles, either
for property damage from storms’ increased frequency and strength or
for morbidity from changes in disease patterns, arguably there could be
liability for breach of the directors’ duties of care if the company
suffered material losses as a result (depending on the content of an
exculpation clause in the company’s certificate of incorporation). 84 A
recent study of twenty-four U.S. oil and gas companies 85 found that
their demand projections and capital expenditures (“CapEx”) on
exploration and production are not in line with agreements made by
countries in Paris in December 2015 to work to limit global warming to
“well below 2ºC” compared to the preindustrial era, and “pursuing
efforts to limit” it to 1.5°C. 86 Carbon Tracker, the U.N. Principles for

82. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) cmt. at 182–83.
83. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(examining liability where directors “failed to exercise any business judgment and failed to make
any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties”).
84. See, e.g., MAX MESSERVY, CERES, INSURER CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE SURVEY REPORT &
SCORECARD:
2016
FINDINGS
&
RECOMMENDATIONS
(2016),
https://www.ceres.org/resources/reports/insurer-climate-risk-disclosure-survey-reportscorecard?report=view [https://perma.cc/SA4G-WNJT]. Ceres is a leading U.S. sustainability
nonprofit working with companies and investors. The cited report analyzes the disclosure of 148
insurance companies required by state law in six U.S. states to disclose information on climate
governance, climate risk management, computer modeling of climate risk modeling, stakeholder
engagement, and measuring and reducing their own GHG emissions. Ceres found that of 148
insurance companies writing over $1 billion in premiums, sixty-four percent had low or minimal
quality disclosure on those factors.
85. DANIELLE FUGERE & ANDREW BEHAR, AS YOU SOW, 2020: A CLEAR VISION FOR PARIS
COMPLIANT
SHAREHOLDER
ENGAGEMENT
(2018),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59a706d4f5e2319b70240ef9/t/5b928615575d1f6f95513a0e/1
536329256160/2020-paris-compliant-shareholder-engagement_20180906.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NHW8-H532].
86. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change art. 2(1)(a), Dec.
12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104. The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, when
countries representing fifty-five percent of global GHG emissions had ratified the Agreement. U.N.
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Responsible Investment, and leading public institutional investors
recently published a study of the value of “stranded assets,” those
“unburnable” assets that must stay in the ground if the goal of keeping
global temperature increases to 2ºC or less is to be met. 87 Evaluating
the stated economic value of the assets in the ground of sixty-nine global
oil and gas companies, the report concluded that “across the oil and gas
industry $2.3 trillion of upstream projects—roughly a third of business
as usual projects to 2025—are inconsistent with global commitments to
limit climate change to a maximum 2ºC.” 88 A report issued in 2021 by
the authoritative International Energy Agency (“IEA”) sets out a
scenario for how the world economy could transition to a net-zero
energy system by 2050 consistent with the Paris Agreement goal of
limiting global average warming to 1.5°C. This report set out four
hundred specific milestones for what needs to be done to meet that
ambitious goal. 89 Significantly, the report recognizes that there can be
no new oil and gas fields approved for development as of 2021, and
neither can there be any new coal mines or mine extensions, if the world
is to meet the Paris goals. 90
If an oil or gas company values its assets in the ground without
any consideration of the possibility that some significant percentage of
those assets will be “stranded,” that company can be materially
misstating its financial position and business risks pursuant to
securities disclosure obligations, as has been asserted in litigation
against ExxonMobil. 91 When securities law cases go forward, the
directors are often sued for breach of fiduciary duty, typically oversight,
for allowing material misstatements or omissions in the firm’s public
filings. The business judgment rule will not protect that kind of claim if
the facts show unconsidered inaction or conscious disregard of a known
duty to act.

FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 7. By August 2021, 191 Parties to the
Convention have ratified the Paris Agreement. Id.
87. JAMES LEATON & ANDREW GRANT, CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE, 2 DEGREES OF
SEPARATION: TRANSITION RISK FOR OIL AND GAS IN A LOW CARBON WORLD (2017),
http://www.carbontracker.org/report/2-degrees-of-separation-transition-risk-for-oil-and-gas-in-alow-carbon-world/ [https://perma.cc/H72Y-4E47].
88. 2 Degrees of Separation—Transition Risk for Oil and Gas in a Low Carbon World,
CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE (June 20, 2017), https://carbontracker.org/reports/2-degrees-ofseparation-transition-risk-for-oil-and-gas-in-a-low-carbon-world-2/
[https://perma.cc/G4G5SEVK].
89. BOUCKAERT ET AL., supra note 33, at 19.
90. Id. at 21.
91. Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 334 F. Supp. 3d 832 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (granting in part and
denying in significant part Exxon’s motion to dismiss securities fraud claims).
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Most companies incorporated in Delaware will have exculpation
clauses that protect directors from liability for breaches of the duty of
care, so whether any individual company’s directors would face
personal liability would depend on that fact as well. Exculpation clauses
cannot protect officers of the company, however, by the clear terms of
the statute. 92 Moreover, at a certain point “unconsidered inaction”
becomes “conscious disregard of a known duty to act,” which is a nonexculpable duty of loyalty problem, so again the facts of any individual
situation would need to be evaluated to determine if the unconsidered
inaction was so serious as to be nonexculpable. Still, we conclude that
“unconsidered inaction” presents a risk of personal liability,
particularly to officers, where climate change has been entirely ignored.
Third, in today’s world there are many other, stronger sources of
pressure on directors and officers to think carefully about climate
change risks and opportunities beyond potential liability risk. There
has been a steady stream of investors and large investor coalitions
putting pressure on companies to explain their long-term strategies and
disclose their climate risks consistent with the Task Force on ClimateRelated Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”), a global standard developed by
investors, accounting firms, and companies. 93 BlackRock, the world’s
largest institutional investor, with over $9 trillion worth of assets under
management in the first quarter of 2021, 94 has started to apply pressure
to its portfolio companies to take climate risk seriously. Starting with
its CEO Larry Fink’s letter in January 2018 to every company in which
it owns shares, BlackRock has been setting out increasingly specific
expectations for climate leadership at the companies it owns. 95 The
2018 letter articulated a stakeholder concept of corporate obligations,
stating that “[t]o prosper over time, every company must not only
deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive
contribution to society.” 96 The letter stated that BlackRock expected
greater clarity from companies about their long-term strategies in light
of trends such as climate change:
This statement of long-term strategy is essential to understanding a company’s actions
and policies, its preparation for potential challenges, and the context of its shorter-term
decisions. Your company’s strategy must articulate a path to achieve financial
92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2021) (limiting the scope of exculpation clauses).
93. See supra note 21.
94. Christine Williamson, BlackRock Tops $9 Trillion on Record Inflows, PENSIONS & INVS.
(Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.pionline.com/money-management/blackrock-tops-9-trillion-recordinflows [https://perma.cc/77CZ-SHQF].
95. See Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose: Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited
Nov. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9L4Z-L9TN].
96. Id.
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performance. To sustain that performance, however, you must also understand the
societal impact of your business as well as the ways that broad, structural trends—from
slow wage growth to rising automation to climate change—affect your potential for
growth. 97

This letter followed a letter to each of its portfolio companies in
December 2017 indicating its expectation that every company will have
at least one climate competent board member; that it would expect
companies in highly exposed industries—oil, gas, coal, and cement, for
instance—to have an entire board of climate competent members; and
that it expects disclosure according to TCFD. 98 By May 2021,
BlackRock’s support for climate competent board members led it to vote
in favor of three of the four board members put forward by an upstart
climate activist hedge fund, Engine No. 1, in a closely watched proxy
contest at ExxonMobil, in which three of Engine No. 1’s candidates
were elected. 99
Another one of many investor initiatives putting pressure on
companies is ClimateAction 100+, in which institutional investors
representing over $55 trillion of global invested capital are engaging
with the “world’s largest corporate greenhouse gas emitters” to
“[improve their] climate change governance, cut[ ] emissions and
strengthen[ ] climate-related financial disclosures.” 100 The basis for
their actions includes fiduciary duty law: “Investors are increasingly
recognising their exposure to climate risks and their fiduciary duty
to respond.” 101
These and other investors are increasingly voting to support
shareholder proposals seeking better information from companies
about how they are managing the transition to a low-carbon economy.
On May 26, 2021, the same day that three of Engine No. 1’s nominees
were elected at ExxonMobil, 63.8 percent of ExxonMobil’s investors
supported a shareholder proposal seeking a report on its climate
97. Id.
98. See Emily Chasan, BlackRock Wields Its $6 Trillion Club to Combat Climate Risks,
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-08/blackrock-wields-its-6-trillionclub-to-combat-climate-risks (last updated Dec. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4UQU-FQWA]
(discussing BlackRock’s 2017 letter).
99. See Sarah McFarlane & Christopher M. Matthews, Oil Giants Are Dealt Major Defeats
on Climate Change as Pressures Intensify, WALL ST. J. (May 26, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-giants-are-dealt-devastating-blows-on-climate-change-aspressures-intensify-11622065455 [https://perma.cc/7KQU-Z7JJ] (stating that BlackRock had
supported three of the four Engine No. 1 nominees).
100. About Climate Action 100+, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, http://www.climateaction.org/about/
(last visited Sept. 29, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9H99-ZNHP].
101. The Business Case, CLIMATE ACTION 100+, https://www.climateaction100.org/businesscase/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8Q2W-5FK3].
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lobbying. 102 Also that day at Chevron, 60.7 percent of investors voted
for a proposal asking the company to reduce its Scope 3 emissions (those
of the users of the product), which it plans to do by working with its
most energy-intensive customers such as cement, manufacturing steel,
transport, and utilities. 103 And, concluding the May 26 climate trifecta,
on that same date the Royal Dutch Shell group was ordered by the
district court in the Netherlands to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
forty-five percent by 2030, as compared to 2019 levels. 104
Thus, we conclude, given these proxy results, votes on
shareholder proposals, and growing risks of climate-related
litigation, 105 we can expect directors to engage seriously with analyses
of how climate change and regulatory efforts to address climate change
will affect their businesses. Business-as-usual assumptions are highly
risky as the world warms (see the Mercer analysis above), and as many
states, cities, businesses, investors, and leaders increasingly recognize
the existential risk that climate change poses to the world that has
supported life in the stable Holocene era in which human life evolved
and thrived. 106 This engagement in serious analysis is required by
officers’ and directors’ fiduciary duty of care to the company and its

102. Robert G. Eccles, Here Comes the Sun for ExxonMobil’s Shareholders, FORBES (June 6,
2021),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobeccles/2021/06/06/here-comes-the-sun-for-exxonmobilsshareholders/?sh=668fd1d93f75 [https://perma.cc/S3RT-W6MA].
103. Id. These were not the only stunning votes on climate-related shareholder proposals.
Eighty percent of Phillips 66 investors voted for a proposal asking the company to set and publish
emissions reduction targets, as did 60% of ConocoPhillips investors. Id. GE management
supported a proposal asking it to report on progress to Net Zero, which then led to a 98% positive
shareholder vote. Id.
104. Rb. Den Haag 26 mei 2021, JOR 2021, 208 m.nt. (Milieudefensie/Royal Dutch Shell PLC)
(Neth). This opinion is discussed below in Section IV.C.2.a.
105. According to the 2020 Global Climate Litigation Report published by the U.N.
Environment Program and produced in conjunction with the Sabin Center for Climate Change
Law at Columbia University, by 2020 there are 1,550 climate change cases filed in thirty-nine
countries, including the European Union, over 1,200 of them in the United States. MICHAEL
BURGER & DANIEL J. METZGER, U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME & COLUMBIA L. SCH. SABIN CTR.
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., GLOBAL CLIMATE LITIGATION REPORT: 2020 STATUS REVIEW 4 (2020).
106. See Will Steffen et al., Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, 115 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 8252 (2018). In this report, published by one of the most respected scientific
organizations in the world, a global team of scientists evaluate the risk of the earth entering
“Hothouse Earth” conditions, caused by current carbon-intensive socioeconomic processes creating
self-reinforcing feedback systems such that the Earth crosses a planetary threshold that would
stabilize the Earth’s temperature. Id. at 8253. The authors conclude that currently we are on a
Earth System pathway headed for Hothouse Earth temperatures, which will have devastating
effects on the economy, political stability, and planet habitability. Id. at 8256. Further, the authors
assert that the “challenge that humanity faces is to create a ‘Stabilized Earth’ pathway that steers
the Earth System away from its current trajectory toward the threshold beyond which is Hothouse
Earth.” Id. at 8254. Such a Stabilized Earth pathway is still possible, but “the door to the Stabilized
Earth pathway may be rapidly closing.” Id. at 8258.
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shareholders, notwithstanding the low risk of fiduciary liability based
on that duty.
B. Duty of Loyalty: The Duty of Oversight
Perhaps the strongest basis for assertions of fiduciary liability
against directors or officers of U.S. companies is where those parties
have consciously disregarded climate change in their oversight of
company activities, particularly where climate change risks have not
been disclosed in companies’ securities filings. 107 This type of claim
would be based on officers’ and directors’ duty to ensure that companies
have a functioning information and reporting system geared to good
faith law compliance by employees of the company. 108 A claim of this
sort, essentially climate linked, was brought against PG&E after its
transmission lines sparked historic fires in California in 2017, given
underlying drought conditions and hotter temperatures caused by
climate change. 109 In recent litigation against the Wells Fargo board for
its lack of oversight over intense pressure on employees to establish
unauthorized customer accounts, and the resulting alleged securities
fraud, the court in the Northern District of California held that the
allegations were sufficient to state a claim of breach of fiduciary duty
where it found that the facts, if proven, showed defendant directors and
top officers were aware of illegal activity and failed to act. 110 This case
was recently settled for $240 million and various corporate
governance reforms. 111

107. It is likely that the largest and most sophisticated companies do not consciously disregard
climate change in their forward planning or infrastructure development. As was revealed in a
series of investigative reports published in the Los Angeles Times and Inside Climate News in
2015, and further detailed in reports and collections of documents developed by such organizations
as the Union for Concerned Scientists and the Center for International Environmental Law, a
number of American companies, such as ExxonMobil and Chevron, have accepted the reality of
climate change for decades, including the contribution of their products to causing climate change.
See infra notes 152–154 (discussing these reports). They have also been using the most
sophisticated climate modeling in their forward planning, such as by reinforcing off-shore oil wells
to take account of sea-level rise, and planning pipelines in Canada to take account of thawing
permafrost. See infra note 152 (discussing Exxon’s response to climate change).
108. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
109. See Verified S’holder Derivative Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 12, Trotter v.
PG&E Corp., 18-cv-04698 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2018) (noting that “drought and wind” fueled the
wildfires).
110. In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1107–09 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
111. See Priya Cherian Huskins, Five Types of Derivative Suits with Massive Settlements,
WOODRUFF SAWYER (Oct. 13, 2020), https://woodruffsawyer.com/do-notebook/five-derivative-suitstypes-massive-settlements/ [https://perma.cc/NE2E-5LAE].

1904

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1875

Originally construed as an aspect of the duty of care in
Caremark, ten years later in Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld Caremark but held that it is an aspect of the duty of
loyalty. Thus, under Delaware Supreme Court controlling precedent in
Stone v. Ritter, duty of loyalty oversight liability can be established
by showing
(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or
controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks
or problems requiring their attention. In either case, imposition of liability requires a
showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations. Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby
demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of
loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good faith. 112

This standard of liability, still called a Caremark claim, gives
rise to a number of possible avenues of inquiry and potential litigation
and liability risks if a board fails to oversee climate risk. The underlying
predicate for a successful Caremark claim, at least prior to the
Delaware Supreme Court’s 2019 opinion in Marchand v. Barnhill,
discussed below, is a legal obligation in positive law outside of corporate
law, which directors need to take some responsibility to know is being
met. 113 The next two Parts of this Article will discuss duty of oversight
precedent, and then discuss three sources of legal obligations that could
support such a claim in the climate change context.
1. Recent Caselaw: Duty of Oversight
After Delaware promulgated section 102(b)(7) in 1986, allowing
exculpation for duty of care cases, and only duty of care cases, plaintiffs
began adding allegations that defendants had not acted in good faith to
complaints to overcome the effects of broad exculpation clauses, which
virtually every company incorporated in Delaware would have had soon
after 1986. Then, after Caremark was decided by Chancellor Allen in
1996, plaintiffs also added allegations that the board had utterly failed
to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system,
such as to constitute a lack of good faith. 114
112. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (citations omitted).
113. In Stone v. Ritter the legal obligations were federal anti-money-laundering regulations.
Id. at 371. AmSouth Bancorporation paid $50 million in fines to settle federal investigations over
its systemic failure to file Suspicious Activity Reports. Id. Plaintiffs then brought fiduciary duty
litigation, claiming that the board had not provided sufficient oversight over the bank’s anti-money
laundering practices. Id. at 370. The directors were ultimately successful in dismissing the
oversight claims. Id. at 372.
114. The original Caremark standard described the standard of liability in these terms:
“Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated upon ignorance of
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It has been clear from the start that the Caremark standard of
liability is a difficult one to meet, however. Indeed, Chancellor Allen
recognized it as such in Caremark itself, stating that “[t]he theory here
advanced [breach of the duty of oversight] is possibly the most difficult
theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a
judgment.” 115 And over two decades of experience have shown
Chancellor Allen to have been prescient: until recently, there were very
few decided cases where the courts have allowed these claims to survive
the board’s motion to dismiss.
Moreover, the Delaware courts have not permitted failure of
oversight claims to proceed where the claim is that generalized business
risks were not being properly monitored by the board, leading to
financial losses. A number of such cases were brought against financial
institutions in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, and
were dismissed. 116 As long as a financial institution had a functioning
risk committee at the board level, claims of a lack of risk oversight
were dismissed.
As was recognized by the Chancery Court in Citigroup, where
the allegation was “failure to properly monitor Citigroup’s business
risk” of subprime mortgage investments and structured financial
products, oversight liability is inappropriate since what was actually
being challenged were business decisions of the board and various
management entities about how much oversight to provide. 117 Such a
claim is properly evaluated as a straightforward duty of care claim,
subject to the protections of the business judgment rule and the
company’s exculpation clause. 118 Yet the Citigroup court did leave open
the possibility that “it may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the
[Caremark] burden under some set of facts,” even where the claim
involves inadequate oversight of business risks, stating that “[a]
plaintiff can show bad faith conduct by, for example, properly alleging
particularized facts that show that a director consciously disregarded
an obligation to be reasonably informed about the business and its

liability creating activities within the corporation . . . only a sustained or systematic failure of the
board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information
and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to
liability.” In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
115. Id. at 967.
116. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. As discussed above, the language of Caremark
can support oversight liability for a properly pleaded “business risk” case, but such a case has not
been brought yet, apparently.
117. In re Citigroup S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123 (Del. Ch. 2009).
118. Id. at 123–24.
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risks or consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and oversee
the business.” 119
In contrast, fiduciary oversight litigation went forward against
AIG where it was alleged that the board failed to exercise oversight over
widespread fraudulent or criminal conduct. 120 Oversight claims against
the directors at Wells Fargo were also deemed sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss, where the company’s financial results were alleged
to have been produced by fraudulent cross-selling (employees setting up
multiple accounts without the customer’s knowledge), and defendants
were alleged to have either participated in the fraud or done nothing to
stop it. 121 Wells Fargo and its directors and officers faced liability under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
(“Exchange Act”) (intentional misstatements or omissions based on
inflated financial results); section 14(a) of the Exchange Act (proxy
violations for statements about the strength of the company’s internal
controls); and fiduciary duty liability for failures of oversight. 122 Both
AIG and Wells Fargo involved situations where the courts construed
the facts to show that the defendant directors knew about the
underlying fraudulent activities or materially misleading public
securities filings, and failed to do anything effective to address
the problems.
In a significant recent development, moreover, the Delaware
Supreme Court in Marchand allowed a duty of oversight claim to go
forward where serious quality problems with the firm’s only product,
ice cream, should have been known by the board, but weren’t because
of inadequate communication between management and the board and
the lack of a reporting system on health and safety. 123 The company had
no protocols for management to bring food safety issues or notices of
regulatory deficiencies to the board, and the board had no committee to
oversee health, safety, and sanitation controls and compliance. 124 The
court found that these serious gaps showed an “utter failure” to assure
119. Id. at 125.
120. See In re Am. Int’l Grp., 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 2009), aff’d, 11 A.3d 228 (Del. 2011)
(noting that the plaintiffs overcame “the difficulty of pleading a breach of the duty of loyalty based
on a failure to monitor”).
121. See In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1108 (N.D.
Cal. 2017) (knowing of allegations of fraud and doing nothing demonstrates the predicate for a
successful oversight fiduciary liability claim).
122. Id. at 1091; see also Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l, Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 984 (Del.
Ch. 2013) (“When faced with knowledge that the company controls are inadequate, the directors
must act, i.e., they must prevent further wrongdoing from occurring. A conscious failure to act, in
the face of a known duty, is a breach of the duty of loyalty.”)
123. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822 (Del. 2019) (finding that the plaintiffs met
the difficult standard for a duty of oversight claim).
124. Id. at 809.
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an adequate information and reporting system existed, an act of “bad
faith” in violation of the duty of loyalty. 125
The facts of Marchand were extreme: from 2009 through 2013
the firm received multiple reports of serious safety and production
deficiencies from federal and state inspectors in Alabama and Texas,
where its facilities were located. 126 Indeed, the company’s own testing
in 2013 and 2014 showed multiple instances of listeria in multiple
cities. 127 None of these problems were brought to the attention of the
board. The board’s first awareness of the problems occurred when three
customers died from listeria, and the company was forced to recall all
of its products, shut down its manufacturing, and lay off one-third of its
staff. Yet, the potential doctrinal significance of Marchand goes beyond
such extreme failures. Food safety is both a legal compliance issue and
a key operational issue for a food production company. Members of the
board of this ice cream manufacturer should have understood that food
safety is “mission critical” to the company’s success, and someone on the
board should have asked questions about the topic or queried why it
was not on the agenda in any board meeting. 128
Applying this precedent to the question of board oversight of
climate, we can conclude that if there are industries where companies
face potential financial losses from climate change, such as insurance
companies whose insured losses outstrip premiums and investments;
coastline property companies with either weakening demand for built
homes or increased costs for protecting the properties; energy
companies with demand for some products collapsing (coal, for
instance); utilities in drought-stressed states; or the utilities in Texas
after unusual winter freezes in 2020–2021 caused huge price spikes for
purchasing energy, and if no committee on the board has taken
ownership of understanding those risks and reporting to the full board
on at least an annual basis, an oversight claim could be successful.
Marchand may well signal a doctrinal development in oversight
liability that both expands the scope of the doctrine to operational
oversight over “mission critical” aspects of the business (such as food
safety in that instance) and expresses higher expectations of board
vigilance regarding such core operations. This conclusion is consistent
with the fact that four subsequent oversight decisions have applied
125. Id. at 823–24.
126. Id. at 811–12.
127. Id. at 812.
128. Id. at 824 (stating that at the defendant ice cream company, food safety was “essential
and mission critical”). The board minutes from the years in question showed no discussions about
food safety. Id. at 812.
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Marchand to reject motions to dismiss, 129 a pattern of success at the
motion to dismiss stage that is quite different than the previous
pattern. 130 Leading commentators such as Professor Steve Bainbridge
and noted D&O specialist Kevin LaCroix have reached a similar
conclusion: Caremark claims have been reinvigorated by Marchand,
and can no longer be called “one of the most difficult claims on which to
found liability,” as stated by Chancellor Allen in Caremark itself. 131
Thus, Marchand may well provide scope for fiduciary liability if a board
has never turned its collective attention to analyzing climate change
risks to the company, its operations, its long-term strategy, or
its disclosure.
2. Implications: Duty of Oversight
Assuming even a narrow interpretation of oversight duties, in
which oversight claims need to be grounded on failures of the board to
provide oversight of positive law obligations, and not business risk, at
least three types of positive law obligations could undergird duty of
oversight claims based on a board’s utter failure to include climate
change in its deliberations. This analysis sets aside the possibility that
Marchand has expanded the oversight cause of action to include
oversight of core operational aspects of a company’s success.
a. International Human Rights
First, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted the
“protect, respect, and remedy” framework in June 2008 identifying
obligations for states and business regarding human rights, and in June
2011 adopted implementation guidelines, including due diligence
obligations for business. 132 Thus, it can be argued, human rights
129. In re Clovis Oncology Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del. Ch.
Ct. Oct. 1, 2019) (failure of oversight of pharmaceutical company’s research protocols); Hughes v.
Xiaoming Hu, No. 2019-0112, 2020 WL 1987029 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (failure of oversight over
audited financial statements and internal accounting function); Teamsters Loc. 443 Health Servs.
v. Chou, No. 2019-0816, 2020 WL 5028065 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2020) (failure of oversight over
indirect subsidiary’s criminal activities regarding handling of pharmaceutical injections); In re
Boeing Co. Derivative Litig., No. 2019-0907, 2021 WL 392851 (Del. Ch. Sept. 7, 2021).
130. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823 n.112 (describing six cases dismissing Caremark claims).
131. See Bainbridge, supra note 64, at 3–5 (discussing expansion of Caremark and
commentators’ views); Kevin M. LaCroix, A “New Era” of Caremark Claims?, The D&O Diary,
(Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.dandodiary.com/2021/01/articles/director-and-officer-liability/a-newera-of-caremark-claims/.
132. The framework identifies three pillars for human rights protection: a state duty to protect
against human rights abuses by third parties, including business; companies’ responsibilities to
respect human rights; and greater access for victims to effective remedy, both judicial and
nonjudicial. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations
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violations are part of the liability risks that directors need to consider
when overseeing law compliance systems, particularly for a company
with global operations. Such law compliance systems would need to
include assessing risks of human rights violations, including those
violations that are climate related. 133 Ignoring any “red flags” in such
due diligence gives rise to support a Caremark claim, as would utter
failure to include human rights obligations within the company’s
information and reporting system. Such a Caremark claim is potentially
viable in particular in the extractive industries, where international
human rights violations by a company’s security personnel in far-flung
locations are an unfortunately common, and thus known, risk.
International human rights obligations may seem too far afield
as a source of directors’ climate change Caremark obligations, which
may be true, still, in the United States. Just this term the U.S. Supreme
Court reiterated its narrow interpretation of the Alien Torts Claims
Act, which had often been the basis for subject matter jurisdiction in
U.S. federal courts for international human rights claims being brought
against companies. 134 Yet, this source of obligation is rapidly evolving.
In its May 26, 2021, opinion ordering Royal Dutch Shell (“Shell”) to cut
its greenhouse gas emissions forty-five percent by 2030, compared to its
2019 emissions, the District Court in The Hague relied upon the U.N.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“UNGP”), and
other soft-law obligations such as the U.N. Global Compact and the
OECD Guideline for Multinational Enterprises to establish the
standard of “due care” in what was essentially a tort-law claim against
Royal Dutch Shell. 135 Thus, “when determining the Shell group’s
corporate policy, [Royal Dutch Shell] must observe the due care
exercised in society.” 136 That due care, the District Court concluded,
“Protect,
Respect
and
Remedy”
Framework,
UNITED
NATIONS
1
(2011),
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DS7-7JH6]
133. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to
Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75 (2005) (evaluating whether human rights
obligations could support Caremark claims).
134. See Nestle USA, Inc. v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 1931, 1937 (2021) (reiterating that the Alien Torts
Claims Act does not apply extraterritorially and that U.S. activities of a defendant corporation
must be more than “general corporate activity” in the United States in order for these claims to be
heard). In Nestle, the Court held that Nestle USA’s activities in the United States financing its
global operations, including those allegedly aiding and abetting the trafficking of children from
Mali to work as child slaves in the Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), were insufficient under its precedent
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013), to establish subject matter
jurisdiction in U.S. courts. Nestle, 141 S. Ct. at 1937.
135. Rb. Den Haag 26 mei 2021, JOR 2021, 208 m.nt. (Milieudefensie/Royal Dutch Shell PLC)
(Neth).
136. Id. ¶ 4.4.1.
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using the language of the UNGP, was that “companies must respect
human rights,” 137 which means “they should avoid infringing on the
human rights of others and should address adverse human rights
impacts with which they are involved.” 138 It was on that basis that the
court stated that the standard of care expected of Shell, as a standard
applicable to “all businesses,” is to adopt measures “to prevent, limit
and, where necessary, address these [adverse human rights]
impacts” 139 of climate change, requiring it to reduce its emissions by
forty-five percent by 2030. 140
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights has determined that the following human rights are most
affected by climate change: the rights to life, self-determination,
development, food, water and sanitation, health, housing, education,
and meaningful and informed participation. 141 Litigation bringing
climate change claims against governments and companies on the basis
of human rights obligations is proliferating around the globe, 142
including claims based on international human rights standards being
used to establish the standard of care in tort cases, such as the
Milieudefensie case against Shell. 143 Presumably the victory against
Royal Dutch Shell at the district court level in the Netherlands will
further motivate plaintiffs’ attorneys and NGOs to explore
international human rights standards as the standard of conduct in
tort-law cases, even in the United States. The limits the U.S. Supreme
137. Id. ¶ 4.1.3.
138. Id. ¶ 4.4.15.
139. Id. Although the court stated that this is the standard of care expected of “all enterprises
regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure,” it did suggest that
meeting the responsibility for respecting human rights could vary as a result of the size of an
enterprise and the severity of the consequences of its business. Id. ¶ 4.4.16. It stated that “much
may be expected” of Shell, being a particularly large, global company in the “worldwide market of
fossil fuels,” with over 1,100 operating subsidiaries, operations in 160 countries, and being
“responsible for significant CO2 emissions.” Id.
140. Id. ¶ 4.1.4.
141. OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CLIMATE
CHANGE
13–25
(2015),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/COP21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V5492L8K] (submission to the 21st Conference of the Parties of the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change).
142. See
Climate
Change
Litigation
Databases,
CLIMATECASECHART.COM,
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/
(last
visited
Aug.
10,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/MZX2-AEN3] (tracking cases).
143. International human rights obligations do not apply directly to private parties, but apply
to states’ obligations towards their citizens. In Milieudefensie, the court recognized this limitation
but was explicit about using the international human rights soft-law instruments (named as such
in the decision) to establish the “unwritten standard of due care” by which Shell’s actions (i.e.,
continuing to explore for, extract, and sell fossil fuels) would be judged. Milieudefensie, ¶ 4.4.11.
In the United States, the “unwritten standard of due care” is called the standard of care, as applied
in tort-law cases.
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Court recently reiterated in Nestle on the extraterritorial application of
the Alien Torts Claims Act would obviously not apply to climate claims
brought in the United States, against a U.S. company, claiming
violations of international human rights standards as the standard of
care, although we can still expect challenges to such a case.
b. Securities Law Disclosure Obligations
Second, public reporting companies in the United States have
clear obligations to evaluate their climate-related risks and possibly
disclose information about those risks pursuant to Item 303 of
Regulation S-K, Management Discussion and Analysis. 144 Regulation
S-K sets out detailed disclosure requirements for public companies for
all of their public reporting documents: quarterly reports, annual
reports, proxy statements, significant event reports, and so forth.
Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) seeks management’s
views of its financial results, as well as discussion of any known trends,
events, or uncertainties that might have a material effect on the
company’s future financial results, assets, or liabilities. In 2010, the
SEC issued guidance to companies to clarify their climate change
related disclosure obligations pursuant to MD&A. 145 The SEC identified
regulatory and legislative developments at a state, federal, and
transnational level that could increase or decrease prices, such as capand-trade arrangements among various states and countries, or new
fuel standards, as issues to be evaluated for disclosure. 146 It also
discussed physical changes from climate change as similarly requiring
analysis, such as increased frequency and intensity of storms having
financial implications for insurance companies, and mortgage lenders,
for instance. 147 While the specific facts at any individual company would
need to be investigated, there could be “conscious disregard of a known
duty to act” where the company’s disclosure process does not include
careful evaluation of climate change–related financial risks for
potential inclusion in the company’s MD&A, or even in notes to the
financial statements.
Here, too, recent developments suggest that well-counselled
boards will take care to incorporate their climate change risks into their
disclosures and disclosure oversight. The SEC has responded to the
144. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.1016 (2021).
145. COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N RELEASE NOS. 33-9106, 34-61469 & FR-82, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010).
146. Id. at 6,290–91.
147. Id. at 6,291.
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Biden Administration’s “whole-of-government” approach to climate by
adopting its own “all-agency” approach to climate change, announcing
specific actions by the Division of Corporate Finance to enhance its
evaluation of climate disclosures, 148 and requesting public input about
what, if anything, the SEC should be doing to require more specific
climate change and other ESG disclosures. 149 These initiatives will take
time to produce specific obligations for companies and their officers and
directors, but the direction of travel is clear: the SEC expects companies
to evaluate their public disclosures with its 2010 Climate Guidance in
focus. Caremark claims are included in approximately three-quarters of
cases brought to challenge companies’ public securities disclosure,
either for misstatements of material facts or omissions to state material
facts necessary to be stated so that other disclosures are not misleading
(the “half-truth doctrine”). 150 Both Caremark and federal securities
liability risks for directors are best addressed, therefore, in the same
way: careful consideration of climate change disclosure obligations, as
shaped by the SEC in its 2010 guidance and as recommended by the
Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures, and incorporation
of climate change in robust fashion into the company’s climate
governance arrangements.
c. Unsubstantiated or Deceptive Opinions
The third potential route to duty of oversight liability would be
where officers and directors of oil, gas, coal, cement, or utilities
companies either participated in, or allowed, deception about whether
greenhouse gases caused by producing, extracting, or using their
products contribute to climate change. Even under narrow
interpretations of Caremark and Stone v. Ritter, directors have
oversight duties to prevent fraud. 151 While again the specific facts
would need to be developed at specific companies, a series of
investigative reports published in the Los Angeles Times and Inside
148. SEC Response to Climate Change and ESG Risks and Opportunities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/sec-response-climate-and-esg-risks-and-opportunities (last visited
Aug. 10, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V2FX-KVU9].
149. Allison Herren Lee, Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosures, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (March 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-changedisclosures [https://perma.cc/P626-2APV].
150. See Huskins, supra note 111.
151. See Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l., Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 984 (Del. Ch. 2013) (duty
to discover and remedy problems with internal financial controls); In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder
Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1107–09 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (granting in part and denying in
part defendants’ motion to dismiss, including denying motions to dismiss claims of breach of
fiduciary duty—based on Caremark and Stone v. Ritter and premised on false statements to the
capital markets).
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Climate News in 2015 provided evidence that ExxonMobil has accepted
the reality of climate change for decades, including that burning their
products contributes to causing climate change. 152 ExxonMobil has also
been using the most sophisticated climate modeling in their forward
planning, such as by reinforcing off-shore oil wells to take account of
sea-level rise or planning pipelines in Canada to take account of
thawing permafrost. 153 At the same time, ExxonMobil has engaged with
other energy companies, such as Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and Peabody
Energy, in extensive public relations campaigns to sow doubt about the
causes and consequences of climate change, aiming to shift public
opinion—as they have—and delay effective regulatory responses to
climate change. 154 This pattern of deception is one basis on which
ExxonMobil has been sued by the Attorney General of Massachusetts
in litigation that remains ongoing. 155 On June 22, 2021, ExxonMobil’s

152. Editorial, Exxon’s Damaging Denial on Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-exxon-climate-change-20151015-story.html
[https://perma.cc/MQ6W-S6H9] (stating that “[a]ccording to reports in the Los Angeles Times and
elsewhere, the oil company’s scientists concluded in the 1970s, ‘80s and ‘90s that climate change
was real, would transform the Earth’s landscape and was driven by human activity—especially
the burning of fossil fuels”); Sara Jerving, Katie Jennings, Masako Melissa Hirsch & Susanne
Rust, What Exxon Knew About the Earth’s Melting Artic, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015),
http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/ [https://perma.cc/MQ6W-S6H9] (detailing a year-long
investigation conducted in conjunction with the Columbia School of Journalism); Neela Banerjee,
Lisa Song & David Hasemyer, Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global
CLIMATE
NEWS
(Sept.
16,
2015),
Warming
Decades
Ago,
INSIDE
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16092015/exxons-own-research-confirmed-fossil-fuels-role-inglobal-warming/ [https://perma.cc/E8EC-NV9K].
153. See Jerving et al., supra note 152 (discussing Exxon’s response to climate change).
154. KATHY MULVEY & SETH SHULMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE CLIMATE
DECEPTION DOSSIERS: INTERNAL FOSSIL FUEL INDUSTRY MEMOS REVEAL DECADES OF CORPORATE
DISINFORMATION 1–5 (July 2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/TheClimate-Deception-Dossiers.pdf [https://perma.cc/N88X-N7L4]. See generally NAOMI ORESKES &
ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT: HOW A HANDFUL OF SCIENTISTS OBSCURED THE TRUTH
ON ISSUES FROM TOBACCO SMOKE TO GLOBAL WARMING 169–216 (2011) (discussing denial of global
warming by U.S. fossil fuel companies).
155. ExxonMobil has brought a motion to dismiss based on a number of grounds,
predominantly lack of personal jurisdiction (contending that all of the challenged statements were
written in Texas and published in Texas and/or New York, with insufficient contacts with
Massachusetts to satisfy due process requirements); failure to state a claim under the
Massachusetts consumer protection statute on which the State Attorney General relies; and that
the complaint is an effort to squash ExxonMobil’s public participation and petitioning of
government, a violation of statutes that prohibit strategic litigation against public participation
(so called “anti-SLAPP” statutes). Exxon Mobil Corporation Demonstrative Exhibit Used at March
(Mar.
15,
2021),
12,
2021
Hearing
on
Motions
to
Dismiss,
MASS.GOV
https://www.mass.gov/doc/march-15-2021-exxon-mobil-corporation-demonstrative-exhibit-usedat-march-12-2021-hearing-on-motions-to-dismiss/download [https://perma.cc/B87Z-3FXG]. A
hearing on ExxonMobil’s Motion to Dismiss was held on March 12, 2021. Id.

1914

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1875

motions to dismiss the case were denied, so we can expect further
discovery in that case, and possibly even a trial in the future. 156
It is actionable fraud under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
and Rule 10b-5, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, for companies to
make statements about their opinions that either do not accurately
express their actual opinions on a topic, or where facts in the company’s
possession do not support the expressed opinions. 157 This pattern of
deception by many energy companies could not only present securities
fraud liability risk, but could risk fiduciary duty of loyalty oversight
liability. At the least, the 2015 publication of articles describing this
pattern of deception by the Los Angeles Times would be a “red flag” that
may require even current directors of oil, gas, coal, or other companies
to investigate the public relations expenditures of their company, their
public relations efforts and statements with respect to climate change,
and to assure themselves that their current statements are not creating
either securities fraud risk, fiduciary oversight liability, or
even fiduciary duty of disclosure fraud risk as articulated in
Malone v. Brincat.
V. FIDUCIARY LAW AS PUBLIC LAW II: BEYOND THE NETHERLANDS?
Each of the avenues for potential fiduciary litigation and
liability discussed above would examine procedural aspects of directors’
and officers’ actions. Has the board put climate on the agenda? Has it
engaged proper expert advice on the specific risks of climate change to
the organization, has that advice been discussed at the board carefully,
and have those risks been incorporated into decisionmaking on
strategy, major transactions, oversight, and disclosure? Has the board
thoroughly examined its public relations strategy for potential
misstatements or omissions about the company’s climate risks? These
are the kinds of questions that are key procedural considerations under
existing fiduciary law.
“Fiduciary duty” is an open-textured legal standard, however.
Like other open-textured legal standards, such as the “reasonable”
person for tort law analyses or “materiality” in securities law, changing
contexts, facts, and developments outside the law will have effects on
how courts evaluate these standards. The opinion by the district court
156. Memorandum of Decision & Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 1984CV03333-BLS1 (Mass. Super. Ct. June
22, 2021); see also Commonwealth v. Exxon Mobil Corp., CLIMATECASECHART.COM,
http://climatecasechart.com/climate-change-litigation/case/commonwealth-v-exxon-mobil-corp/
(last visited Sept. 30, 2021) [https://perma.cc/GF27-4CGW].
157. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175 (2015).
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in The Hague ordering Shell to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
indicates this potential: it explicitly incorporated “soft law” human
rights treaties and multilateral instruments into the tort-law standard
of care that it applied to evaluate Shell’s responsibilities. So, could
corporate fiduciary duties be construed in a more substantive way,
creating a duty on the part of the board to adopt a Paris-aligned
business strategy, based on the changing contexts discussed throughout
this Article? That at least seems plausible, to this Author, if the right
strategic litigation is brought to clearly tee up the question of the
board’s substantive responsibilities regarding climate.
It is highly doubtful to this Author that a Delaware court would
hold, today, that directors have a “societal duty,” as argued by Jaap
Winter, and certainly unlikely that a Delaware court would state any
conclusion in those terms. Yet it is not unlikely to think that the concept
of what boards and executive teams need to actually do to advance the
interests of “the corporation and its shareholders,” which is the object
of the board’s fiduciary obligations in Delaware, 158 is changing. These
changes in boards’ actions will require, in at least many instances,
deeper consideration than today of the effects of corporate action on the
climate, and actual decisions to adopt Paris-aligned strategies.
This consideration, this Author argues, is a slice of Jaap Winter’s
“societal duty.” 159
As discussed above, social norms of what is responsible
corporate conduct are changing. 160 Global, diversified investors
158. See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (board’s obligation is to act
in “the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders”); Paramount Comms. v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) )(“[D]irectors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a
corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed [short-term or long-term]
investment horizon.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“In carrying out their
managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and
its shareholders.”); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not trustees,
corporate officers and directors stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
shareholders.”).
159. Winter’s concept is broader than this “climate-aware substantive duty,” since his concept
would also require the board to consider the effects of its actions on all of society. In practice, the
same argument that is being advanced here, using climate at the focal point, may work regarding
other issues where social norms, regulators, investors, and courts are putting pressure on
companies, and so the company’s long-term success may require the board to consider broader
stakeholders. Equality, diversity, and inclusion (“EDI”) would seem to be another issue that is
experiencing that confluence. See Brummer & Strine, supra 6, at 61 (discussing the board’s
Caremark duties to incorporate EDI considerations).
160. This Author has written extensively about developing trends of corporate responsibility
and investors’ interests in better environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) data. See
generally Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe
eds., 2018); Petition from Cynthia A. Williams, Osler Chair in Bus. L., Osgoode Hall L. Sch., and

1916

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:6:1875

increasingly expect companies to have a net-zero business plan;
majority votes on shareholder resolutions seeking disclosure of the
company’s net-zero plans in this year’s proxy season are harbingers of
things to come as climate-aware shareholders increasingly are putting
pressure on companies to have such plans and disclose details about
them. Courts and litigators, too, are presenting new sources of litigation
risk. In such a context, in a world being buffeted by weather extremes
and changing regulatory demands, what a board needs to actually do to
advance the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders is
changing. To thrive long-term, companies will need to develop
strategies that present a realistic hope of financial success, while also
taking into account these pressures and disruptions. . Arguably that is
a substantive duty, not merely procedural.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the private fiduciary duties of
directors and officers in American companies can operate to inculcate
public social responsibilities into the firm, here with respect to climate
change. This incorporation into the firm’s strategy is not argued to
require changing the purpose of the firm or incorporating a stakeholder
perspective on the firm’s responsibilities. Rather, as the social and
environmental context in which firms operate changes, those corporate
actions necessary to thrive financially also need to change.
Today, there is a broad scientific consensus about the reality and
implications of climate change. That consensus is shared by financial
regulators, investors, and many members of civil society, leading to
pressures on company directors and officers to incorporate climate
change into their strategies, oversight, and disclosure as an aspect of
good management. Failure to do so may risk reputational and financial
harm, but also fiduciary liability, as indicated by recent oversight cases
in Delaware. Well-counselled boards will incorporate climate change
risks as a defensive measure against far-reaching books and records
requests and potential liability. Proactive boards will incorporate
climate change opportunities to position their companies for success as
the transition to a net-zero world accelerates.
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